Abstract-This paper investigates four topics. (1) It examines the different roles played by the propensity score (the probability of selection into treatment) in matching, instrumental variable, and control function methods. (2) It contrasts the roles of exclusion restrictions in matching and selection models. (3) It characterizes the sensitivity of matching to the choice of conditioning variables and demonstrates the greater robustness of control function methods to misspecification of the conditioning variables. (4) It demonstrates the problem of choosing the conditioning variables in matching and the failure of conventional model selection criteria when candidate conditioning variables are not exogenous in a sense defined in this paper.
I. Introduction
T HE method of matching has become popular in evaluating social programs because it is easy to understand and easy to apply. It uses observed explanatory variables to adjust for differences in outcomes unrelated to treatment that give rise to selection bias. Propensity-score matching as developed by Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983) is particularly simple to apply. The propensity score is the probability that an agent takes treatment conditional on the available covariates. If the analyst knows (without having to estimate) the probability that a person takes treatment, and the assumptions of matching are fulfilled, he can condition on that known conditional probability and avoid selection in means and marginal distributions of outcomes. This conditional choice probability also plays a central role in econometric selection models based on the principle of control functions (Heckman, 1980; Heckman & Robb, 1986; Heckman & Hotz, 1989; Ahn & Powell, 1993) and in instrumental variable models (see for example Heckman & Vytlacil, 1999 , 2001 , or Heckman, 2001 ).
The multiple use of the propensity score in different statistical methods has given rise to some confusion in the applied literature. 1 This paper seeks to clarify the different assumptions that justify the propensity score in selection, matching, and instrumental variable methods. We develop the following topics:
1. We organize the discussion of the choice among alternative estimators around the economic theory of choice. We compare the different roles that the propensity score plays in three widely used econometric methods, and the implicit economic assumptions that underlie applications of these methods.
2. Conventional matching methods do not distinguish between excluded and included variables in outcome and treatment assignment equations. 2 We show that matching breaks down when there are variables that predict the choice of treatment perfectly, whereas control function methods take advantage of exclusion restrictions and use the information available from perfect prediction to obtain identification. Matching assumes away the possibility of perfect prediction, whereas selection models rely on this property in limit sets. 3. We define the concepts of relevant information and minimal relevant information, and distinguish agent and analyst information sets. We state clearly what information is required to identify different treatment parameters. In particular we show that when the analyst does not have access to the minimal relevant information, matching estimates of different treatment parameters are biased. Having more information, but not all of the minimal relevant information, can increase the bias over having less information. Enlarging the analyst's information set with variables that do not belong in the relevant information set may either increase or decrease the bias from matching. Because the method of control functions explicitly models omitted relevant conditioning variables rather than assuming that there are none, it is more robust to omitted conditioning variables. 4. The method of matching offers no guidance as to which variables to include or exclude in conditioning sets. Such choices can greatly affect inference. There is no support for the rule of selecting matching variables by choosing the set of variables that maximizes the probability of successful prediction into treatment or by including variables in conditioning sets that are statistically significant in choice equations. This weakness is shared by many econometric procedures, but is not fully appreciated in recent applications of matching which apply standard model selection rules to choose conditioning sets.
To simplify the exposition, throughout this paper we consider a one-treatment, two-outcome model. Our main points apply more generally.
II. A Prototypical Model of Economic Choice
To focus the discussion and to interpret the implicit assumptions underlying the different estimators presented in this paper, we present a benchmark model of economic choice. For simplicity we consider two potential outcomes (Y 0 , Y 1 ). We let D ϭ 1 if Y 1 is selected, and D ϭ 0 if Y 0 is selected. Agents pick the realized outcome by utility maximization. The agent may be different from the person experiencing the outcome (for example, the agent may be a parent choosing outcomes for a child). Let V be utility. We write
where the Z are factors (observed by the analyst) determining choices, U V are the unobserved (by the analyst) factors determining choice, and 1 is an indicator function [1(A) ϭ 1 if A is true; 1(A) ϭ 0 otherwise]. We consider differences between agent information sets and analyst information sets in section VI. Potential outcomes are written in terms of observed variables (X) and unobserved (by the analyst) outcome-specific variables
We assume throughout that U 0 , U 1 , U V are (absolutely) continuous random variables and that all means are finite. The individual-level treatment effect is
More familiar forms of equations (1), (2a), and (2b) are additively separable:
Additive separability is not strictly required in matching, or in most versions of selection (control function) models. However, we use the additively separable representation throughout most of this paper because of its familiarity, noting when it is a convenience and when it is an essential part of a method. The distinction between X and Z is crucial to the validity of many econometric procedures. In matching as conventionally formulated there is no distinction between X and Z. The roles of X and Z in alternative estimators are explored in this paper.
III. Parameters of Interest in This Paper
Many different treatment parameters can be derived from this model if U 1 U 0 and agents know or partially anticipate U 0 , U 1 in making their decisions (see Heckman & Robb, 1985 Heckman, 1992; Heckman, Smith, & Clements, 1997; Heckman, 2001; Heckman & Vytlacil, 2000) . Here we focus on certain means because they are traditional. As noted by Heckman and Vytlacil (2000) and Heckman (2001) , the traditional means often do not answer interesting economic questions.
The traditional means conditional on covariates are: The MTE is the marginal treatment effect introduced into the evaluation literature by Björklund and Moffitt (1987) . It is the average gain to persons who are indifferent to participating in sector 1 or sector 0 given X, Z. These are persons at the margin, defined by X and Z, so Z plays a role in the definition of the parameter by fixing V (Z) in (1) or (1Ј) and hence fixing U V . An alternative and equivalent definition in this setup is MTE ϭ E(Y 1 Ϫ Y 0 ͉X, U V ). Heckman and Vytlacil (1999 , 2000 show how the MTE can be used to construct all mean treatment parameters, including the policy-relevant treatment parameters, under the conditions specified in their papers. These parameters can be defined for the population as a whole, not conditioning on X or Z. 3 In the case of additive separability,
in the case of additive separability. The MTE is defined for a subset of persons indifferent between the two sectors and so is defined for X and Z. The bias is the difference between average U 1 for participants and marginal U 1 minus the difference between average U 0 for nonparticipants and marginal U 0 . Each of these terms is a bias, which can be called a selection bias. These biases can be defined conditional on X (or X and Z, or X, Z, and V, in the case of the MTE) or unconditionally.
V. How Different Methods Eliminate the Bias
In this section we consider the identification conditions that underlie matching, control functions, and instrumental variable methods to identify the three parameters using the data on mean outcomes. We start with the method of matching.
A. Matching
The method of matching as conventionally formulated makes no distinction between X and Z. Define the conditioning set as W ϭ (X, Z). The strong form of matching advocated by Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983) , and numerous predecessors, assumes that
where --denotes independence given the conditioning variables after ͉. Condition (M-2) implies that the mean treatment parameters can be defined for all values of W (that is, for each W, in very large samples there are observations for which we observe a Y 0 and other observations for which we observe a Y 1 ). Rosenbaum and Rubin show that under conditions (M-1) and (M-2)
This reduces the dimensionality of the matching problem. They assume that P is known. 4 Under these assumptions, conditioning on P eliminates all three biases defined in section IV for parameters defined conditional on P, because
Thus for TT we can identify the counterfactual mean E(Y 0 ͉D ϭ 1, P(W )) from E(Y 0 ͉D ϭ 0, P(W )). In fact, we only need the weaker condition Y 0 --D͉P(W ) to remove the bias, 5 because E(Y 1 ͉D ϭ 1, P(W )) is known, and only E(Y 0 ͉D ϭ 1, P(W )) is unknown. From the observed conditional means we can form ATE. Because the conditioning is on P(W), the parameter is defined conditional on it and not X or (X, Z). Integrating over P(W ) produces unconditional ATE. Integrating over P(W ) given D ϭ 1 produces unconditional TT. 6 Observe that because ATE ϭ TT for all X, Z under conditions (M-1) and (M-2), the effect for the average person participating in the program is the same as the effect for the marginal person, conditional on W, and there is no bias in estimating MTE. 7 The strong implicit assumption that the marginal participant in a program gets the same return as the average participant in the program, conditional on W, is an unattractive implication of these assumptions (see Heckman, 2001; . The method assumes that all of the dependence between U V and (U 1 , U 0 ) is eliminated by conditioning on W:
This motivates the term "selection on observables" introduced by Heckman and Robb (1985, 1986) .
Assumption (M-2) has the unattractive feature that if the analyst has too much information about the decision of who takes treatment, so that P(W ) ϭ 1 or 0, the method breaks down because people cannot be compared at a common W. The method of matching assumes that, given W, some unspecified randomization device allocates people to treatment. The fact that the cases P(W ) ϭ 1 and P(W) ϭ 0 must be eliminated suggests that methods for choosing W based on the fit of the model to data on D are potentially problematic. We develop this point systematically in section VI-F.
Introducing the distinction between X and Z allows the analyst to overcome the problem arising from perfect pre-diction of treatment assignment for some values of (X, Z) if there are some variables Z not in X. If P is a nontrivial function of Z [so P(X, Z) varies with Z for all X] and Z can be varied independently of X for all points of support of X, 8 and if outcomes are defined solely in terms of X, the problem of perfect classification is solved. Treatment parameters can be defined for all support values of X, because for any value (X, Z) that perfectly classifies D, there is another value (X, ZЈ), ZЈ Z, that does not. See Heckman, Ichimura, and Todd (1997) and our discussion below.
Offsetting the disadvantages of matching, the method of matching with a known conditioning set that produces condition (M-1) does not require separability of outcome or choice equations, exogeneity of conditioning variables, exclusion restrictions, or adoption of specific functional forms of outcome equations. Such features are commonly used in conventional selection (control function) methods and conventional applications of IV, although recent work in semiparametric estimation relaxes many of these assumptions, as we note below. Moreover, the method of matching does not strictly require condition (M-1). One can get by with weaker mean independence assumptions:
in the place of the stronger conditions (M-1). However, if (M-1Ј) is invoked, the assumption that one can replace W by P(W ) does not follow from the analysis of Rosenbaum and Rubin, and is an additional new assumption. In the recent literature, the claim is sometimes made that matching is "for free" (see, for example, Gill and Robins, 2001) . The idea underlying this claim is that because E(Y 0 ͉D ϭ 1, W ) is not observed, we might as well set it to E(Y 0 ͉D ϭ 0, W ), an implication of condition (M-1). This argument is correct so far as data description goes. Matching imposes just-identifying restrictions and in this sense-at a purely empirical level-is as good as any other just-identifying assumption in describing the data.
However, the implied economic restrictions are not "for free." The statement that, conditional on X and Z or conditional on P(W ), the marginal person is the same as the average person is a strong and restrictive implication of the conditional independence assumptions and is not a "free" assumption in terms of its economic content. 9
B. Control Functions
The principle motivating the method of control functions is different. [See Heckman (1976 , 1978 , 1980 and Heckman and Robb (1985, 1986) where this principle was developed.] Like matching, it works with conditional expectations of (Y 1 , Y 0 ) given (X, Z, D) . Conventional applications of the control function method assume additive separability, which is not required in matching. Strictly speaking, additive separability is not required in the application of control functions either. 10 What is required is a model relating the outcome unobservables to the observables, including the choice of treatment. The method of matching assumes that, conditional on the observables (X, Z), the unobservables are independent of D. 11 For the additively separable case, control functions based on the principle of modeling the conditional expectations of Y 1 and Y 0 given X, Z, and D can be written as
Thus, in the method of control functions, if one can model E(U 1 ͉X, Z, D ϭ 1) and E(U 0 ͉X, Z, D ϭ 0) and these functions can be independently varied against 1 (X ) and 0 (X ) respectively, one can identify 1 (X ) and 0 (X ) up to constant terms. 12 Nothing in the method intrinsically requires that X, Z, or D be stochastically independent of U 1 or U 0 , although conventional methods often assume this.
If we assume that (U 1 , U V ) --(X, Z) and adopt equation (1Ј) as the treatment choice model augmented so X and Z are determinants of treatment choice, we obtain
and the control function only depends on the propensity score. The key assumption needed to represent the control 8 A precise sufficient condition is that Support(Z͉X) ϭ Support(Z). One can get by with the weaker condition that in any neighborhood of X, there is a Z* such that 0 Ͻ Pr(D ϭ 1͉X, Z*) Ͻ 1 and that Support (Z*) ʕ Support (Z͉X). 9 As noted by Heckman, Ichimura, Smith, and Todd (1998) , if one seeks to identify E(Y 1 Ϫ Y 0 ͉D ϭ 1, W), one only needs to impose a weaker condition
This imposes the assumption of no selection on levels of Y 0 (given W) and not the assumption of no selection on levels of Y 1 or on Y 1 Ϫ Y 0 , as condition (M-1) does. Marginal can be different from average in this case. 10 Examples of nonseparable selection models are found in Cameron and Heckman (1998) .
11 Or mean-independent, in the case of mean parameters. 12 Heckman and Robb (1985, 1986) introduce this general formulation of control functions. The identifiability requires that the members of the pairs ( 1 (X ), E(U 1 ͉X, Z, D ϭ 1)) and ( 0 (X ), E(U 0 ͉X, Z, D ϭ 0)) be variation-free or measurably separable so that they can be independently varied against each other. See Heckman and Vytlacil (2004) for a precise statement of these conditions. function solely as a function of P(X, Z) is
Under this condition
with lim P31 K 1 (P) ϭ 0 and lim P30 K 0 (P) ϭ 0, where it is assumed that Z can be independently varied for all X, and the limits are obtained by changing Z while holding X fixed. 13 These limit results just say that when the values of X, Z are such that the probability of being in a sample is 1, there is no selection bias. One can approximate the K 1 (P) and K 0 (P) terms by polynomials in P (see Heckman, 1980; Heckman & Robb, 1985 or Heckman & Hotz, 1989) . If K 1 (P(X, Z)) can be independently varied from 1 (X) and K 0 (P(X, Z)) can be independently varied from 0 (X), we can identify 1 (X) and 0 (X) up to constants. If there are limit sets ‫ޚ‬ 0 and ‫ޚ‬ 1 such that for each X we have lim Z3‫ޚ‬ 0 P(X, Z) ϭ 0 and lim Z3‫ޚ‬ 1 P(X, Z) ϭ 1, then we can identify the constants; for in those limit sets we identify 0 (X) and 1 (X). 14 Under these conditions, it is possible to nonparametrically identify all three conditional treatment parameters:
Unlike the method of matching, the method of control functions allows the conditional marginal treatment effect to be different from the conditional average treatment effect and from the conditional effect of treatment on the treated. Although conventional practice is to derive the functional forms of K 0 (P) and K 1 (P) by making distributional assumptions [such as normality or other conventional distributional assumptions; see Heckman, Tobias, and ], this is not an intrinsic feature of the method, and there are many nonnormal and semiparametric versions of this method (see Powell, 1994 .
In its semiparametric implementation, the method of control functions requires an exclusion restriction (a Z not in X ) to achieve nonparametric identification. 17 Without any functional-form assumptions one cannot rule out a worst case analysis where, for example, if X ϭ Z, then K 1 (P(X )) ϭ ␣(X ) where ␣ is a scalar. Then there is perfect collinearity between the control function and the conditional mean of the outcome equation, and it is impossible to control for selection. Even though this case is not generic, it is possible. The method of matching does not require an exclusion restriction, because it makes a stronger assumption, which we clarify below. Without additional assumptions, the method of control functions requires that in certain limit sets of Z, P(X, Z) ϭ 1 and P(X, Z) ϭ 0, to 13 More precisely, that Support(Z ͉X ) ϭ Support(Z) and that limit sets of Z, ‫ޚ‬ 0 and ‫ޚ‬ 1 exist such that as Z 3 ‫ޚ‬ 0 , P (X, Z) 3 0 and as Z 3 ‫ޚ‬ 1 , P(X, Z) 3 1. This is also the support condition used in the generalization of matching by Heckman, Ichimura, and Todd (1997) .
14 This condition is sometimes called "identification at infinity." See Heckman (1990) or Andrews and Schafgans (1998) . 15 Because
it follows that
See Heckman and Robb (1986) . The expression E Z͉X,Dϭ1 integrates out Z for a given X, D ϭ 1. 16 As established in Heckman and Vytlacil (2000, 2004) , under assumption (C-1), the representation (1Ј), and additional regularity conditions
The third expression follows from algebraic manipulation. Expressions conditional on X and V ϭ 0 are obtained by integrating out Z conditional on X and V ϭ 0. 17 For many common functional forms for the distributions of unobservables, no exclusion is required. achieve full nonparametric identification. 18 The conventional method of matching excludes this case.
Both methods require that treatment parameters be defined on a common support that is the intersection of the supports of X given D ϭ 1 and X given D ϭ 0:
A similar requirement is imposed on the generalization of matching with exclusion restrictions introduced in Heckman, Ichimura, and Todd (1997) . Recall that exclusion [adding a Z in the probability of treatment equation that is not in the outcome equation, where Pr(D ϭ 1͉X, Z) is the choice probability], both in matching and in selection models, enlarges the set of X values that satisfy this condition. If
We require the existence of such Z values in the neighborhood of all values of X, Z such that P(X, Z) ϭ 0 or 1.
In the method of control functions, P(X, Z) is a conditioning variable used to predict U 1 conditional on D and U 0 conditional on D. In the method of matching, it is used to characterize the stochastic independence between (U 0 , U 1 ) and D. In the method of control functions, as conventionally applied, (U 0 , U 1 ) --(X, Z), but this assumption is not intrinsic to the method. 19 This assumption plays no role in matching if the correct conditioning set [that is, one that satisfies conditions (M-1) and (M-2)] is known. However, as noted in section VI-F, exogeneity plays a key role in devising rules to select appropriate conditioning variables. The method of control functions does not require that (U 0 , U 1 ) --D͉(X, Z), which is a central requirement of matching. Equivalently, the method of control functions does not require
whereas matching does. Thus matching assumes access to a richer set of conditioning variables than is assumed in the method of control functions.
The method of control functions is more robust than the method of matching, in the sense that it allows for outcome unobservables to be dependent on D even conditioning on (X, Z), and it models this dependence, whereas the method of matching assumes no such dependence. Matching is thus a special case of the method of control functions 20 in which, under assumptions (M-1) and (M-2),
In the method of control functions, in the case when (X,
To identify 1 (X ) Ϫ 0 (X ) one must isolate it from K 1 (P(X, Z)) and K 0 (P(X, Z)). The coefficient of D does not correspond to any standard treatment effect. Under assumptions (M-1) and (M-2) of the method of matching, we may write expressions conditional on P(W ):
Notice that if we further invoke assumption (C-1), then
A parallel argument can be made conditioning on X and Z instead of P(W ).
Under the assumptions that justify matching, treatment effects ATE and TT [conditional on P(W )] are identified from the coefficient on D in either of the two preceding equations. It is not necessary to invoke condition (C-1) in the application of matching, although it simplifies expressions. Condition (M-2) guarantees that D is not perfectly predictable by W, so the variation in D identifies the treatment parameter. Thus the coefficient of D in the more general control function model does not correspond to any standard treatment parameter, whereas the coefficient on D corresponds to a treatment parameter under the assumptions of the matching model. Under condition (C-1), 1 (P(W )) Ϫ 0 (P(W )) ϭ ATE and ATE ϭ TT ϭ MTE, so the method of matching identifies all of the [conditional on P(W )] mean treatment parameters. 21 Under the assumptions justifying matching, when the means of Y 1 and Y 0 are the parameters of interest and W satisfies conditions (M-1) and (M-2), the bias terms defined in section IV vanish. They do not in the more general case considered by the method of control functions. This is the mathematical counterpart of the randomization implicit in matching: conditional on W or P(W ), (U 1 , U 0 ) are random with respect to D. The method of control functions allows them to be nonrandom with respect to D. In the absence of functionalform assumptions, a sufficient condition for identification is an exclusion restriction to separate out K 0 (P(X, Z)) from the coefficient on D. Matching produces identification without exclusion restrictions, whereas identification with exclusion restrictions is a central feature of the control function method in the absence of functional-form assumptions.
The fact that the control function approach is more general than the matching approach is implicitly recognized in the work of Rosenbaum (1995) and Robins (1997) . Their sensitivity analyses for matching when there are unobserved conditioning variables are, in their essence, sensitivity analyses using control functions. 22 Aakvik, Heckman, and Vytlacil (2004) , Carneiro, Hansen, and Heckman (2003) , and Cunha, Heckman, and Navarro (2003) explicitly model the relationship between matching and selection models using factor structure models, treating the omitted conditioning variables as unobserved factors and estimating their distribution. Tables 1 and 2 perform sensitivity analyses under different assumptions about the parameters of the underlying selection model. In particular, we assume that the data are generated by the model of equations (1Ј), (2aЈ), and (2bЈ) and that
We assume no X and assume that Z --(U 1 , U 0 , U V ). Using the formulas derived in the Appendix, we can write the biases conditional on Z ϭ z as Bias TT ͑Z ϭ z͒ ϭ Bias TT ͑P͑Z͒ ϭ p͑z͒͒
٪ and ⌽٪ are the pdf and cdf of a standard normal random variable, and p( z) is the propensity score evaluated at Z ϭ z. We assume that 1 ϭ 0 , so that the true average treatment effect is 0. We simulate the mean bias for TT (Table 1) and ATE (Table 2) for different values of the jV and j . The results in the tables show that, as we let the variances of the outcome equations grow, the value of the mean bias that we obtain can become substantial. With larger correlations come larger biases. These tables demonstrate the greater generality of the control function approach. Even if the correlation between the observables and the unobservables ( jV ) is small, so that one might think that selection on unobservables is relatively unimportant, we still obtain substantial biases if we do not control for relevant omitted conditioning variables. Only for special values of the parameters do we avoid bias by matching. These examples also demonstrate that sensitivity analyses can be conducted for analysis based on control function methods even when they are not fully identified as in Vijverberg (1993) . 21 This result also holds if assumption (C-1) is not satisfied, but then the treatment effects include E͑U 1 ͉P͑W͒͒ Ϫ E͑U 0 ͉P͑W͒͒.
22 See also Vijverberg (1993) , who does such a sensitivity analysis in a parametric selection model with an unidentified parameter. 
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C. Instrumental Variables
Both the method of matching and the method of control functions work with E(Y͉X, Z, D) and Pr(D ϭ 1͉X, Z). The method of instrumental variables works with E(Y͉X, Z)
and Pr(D ϭ 1͉X, Z). There are two versions of the method of instrumental variables: (a) conventional linear instrumental variables and (b) local instrumental variables (LIV) (Heckman & Vytlacil, 1999 , 2000 Heckman, 2001) . LIV is equivalent to a semiparametric selection model (see Vytlacil, 2002) . It is an alternative way to implement the principle of control functions. LATE (Imbens & Angrist, 1994 ) is a special case of LIV under the conditions we specify below.
We first consider the conventional method of instrumental variables. In this framework, P(X, Z) arises less naturally than it does in the matching and control function approaches. Z is the instrument, and P(X, Z) is a function of the instrument.
Using the model of equations (2aЈ) and (2bЈ), we obtain
where
we obtain the conventional model to which IV is typically applied, with D correlated with U 0 . Standard instrumental variable conditions apply and P(X, Z) is a valid instrument if
and Pr͑D ϭ 1͉X, Z͒ is a nontrivial function of Z for each X.
and the marginal equals the average conditional on X and Z. The requirement that D --(U 1 Ϫ U 0 )͉X is strong and assumes that agents do not participate in the program on the basis of any information about unobservables in gross gains (Heckman & Robb, 1985 Heckman, 1997) .
The economically more interesting case for many problems arises when U 1 U 0 and D --⁄ (U 1 Ϫ U 0 ), so agents participate in the program based at least in part on factors not measured by the economist. To identify ATE (X ), we require
and condition (IV-2) (Heckman & Robb, 1985 Heckman, 1997) . To identify TT (X ), we require 
and condition (IV-2). No simple conditions exist to identify the MTE using linear instrumental variables methods in the general case where D --⁄ (U 1 Ϫ U 0 )͉X, Z. Heckman and Vytlacil (2000, 2004) characterize what conventional IV estimates in terms of a weighted average of MTEs. The conditions required to identify ATE using P as an instrument may be written in the following alternative form:
a function that depends only on X and not Z. If U 1 ϭ U 0 (everyone with the same X responds to treatment in the same way) or (U 1 Ϫ U 0 ) --D͉P(X, Z), X (people do not participate in treatment on the basis of unobserved gains), then M(X) does not depend on Z, and these conditions are the standard instrumental variable conditions. In general, the conditions are not satisfied by economic choice models, except under special cancellations that are not generic. If Z is a determinant of choices, and U 1 Ϫ U 0 is in the agent's choice set (or is only partly correlated with information in the agent's choice set), then this condition is not satisfied generically.
These identification conditions are fundamentally different from the conditions required to justify matching and control function methods. In matching, the essential condition for means [conditioning on X and P(X, Z)] is
These conditions require that, conditional on P(X, Z) and X, the factors U 1 and U 0 be mean-independent of U V (or D) . If assumption (C-1) is invoked, then 1 (W ) and 0 (W ) are the conditional means of Y 1 and Y 0 respectively, and the two preceding expressions are zero. However, as we have stressed repeatedly, assumption (C-1) is not strictly required in matching.
The method of control functions models and estimates the dependence of U 0 and U 1 on D rather than assuming that it vanishes. The method of linear instrumental variables requires that the composite error term U 0 ϩ D(U 1 Ϫ U 0 ) be meanindependent of Z [or P(X, Z)], given X. Essentially, these conditions require that the dependence of U 0 and D(U 1 Ϫ U 0 ) on Z vanish through conditioning on X. Matching requires that U 1 and U 0 be independent of D given (X, Z). These conditions are logically distinct. One set of conditions does not imply the other set . Conventional IV in the general case does not answer well-posed economic questions (see Carneiro, Heckman, & Vytlacil, 2001) .
Assuming finite means, local instrumental variables methods developed by Heckman and Vytlacil (1999 , 2000 estimate all three treatment parameters in the general case where (U 1 Ϫ U 0 ) --D͉(X, Z) under the following additional conditions:
Under these conditions, 23
Only conditions (LIV-1)-(LIV-3) are required to identify this parameter locally. Condition (LIV-4) is required to use the MTE to identify the standard treatment parameters. As demonstrated by Heckman and Vytlacil (1999 , 2000 and Heckman (2001) , over the support of (X, Z), MTE can be used to construct [under condition (LIV-4)] or bound (in the case of partial support) ATE and TT. Policyrelevant treatment effects can be defined. LATE is a special case of this method. 24 Table 3 summarizes the alternative assumptions used in matching, control functions, and instrumental variables to identify treatment parameters identify conditional (on X or X, Z). For the rest of the paper we discuss matching, the topic of this special issue. We first turn to consider the informational requirements of matching.
23 Proof: Vytlacil (2002) establishes that LATE is a semiparametric version of a control function estimator.
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VI. The Informational Requirements of Matching and the Bias When They Are Not Satisfied
This section considers the informational requirements for matching. 25 We introduce five distinct information sets and establish relationships among them: (1) an information set (I R* ) that satisfies conditional independence (M-1), a relevant information set; (2) the minimal information set (I R ) needed to satisfy conditional independence (M-1), the minimal relevant information set; (3) the information set (I A ) available to the agent at the time decisions to participate are made; (4) the information available to the economist, (I E* ); and (5) the information (I E ) used by the economist in conducting an analysis. We will denote the random variables generated by these sets as I R* , I R , I A , I E* , I E , respectively. 26 After defining these information sets, we show the biases that result when econometricians use information other than a relevant information set. More information does not necessarily reduce the bias in matching. Standard algorithms for selecting conditioning variables are not guaranteed to pick the relevant conditioning variables or reduce bias compared to conditioning sets not selected by these algorithms.
First we define the information sets more precisely.
Definition 1. We say that (I R* ) is a relevant information set if its associated random variable, I R* , possibly vector valued, satisfies condition (M-1), so
Definition 2. We say that (I R ) is a minimal relevant information set if it is the intersection of all sets (I R* ) and (Y 1 , Y 0 ) --D͉I R . The associated random variable I R is the minimum amount of information that guarantees that condition (M-1) is satisfied. 27 If we define the relevant information set as one that produces conditional independence, it may not be unique. If the set (I R ) satisfies the conditional independence condition, then the set (I R , Q) such that Q --(Y 1 , Y 0 )͉I R would also guarantee conditional independence. For this reason, we define the relevant information set to be minimal, that is, to be the intersection of all relevant sets that still produce conditional independence between (Y 1 , Y 0 ) and D. 25 See also the discussion in Barros (1986) and Gerfin and Lechner (2002) . 26 We start with a primitive probability space (⍀, , P) with associated random variables I. We use minimal -algebras and assume the I are measurable with respect to these random variables. Obviously, strictly monotonic or affine transformations of the I preserve the information and can substitute for the I. 27 Observe that the intersection of all sets (I R* ) may be empty and hence may not be characterized by a (possibly vector valued) random variable I R that guarantees (Y 1 , Y 2 ) --D͉I R . If the information sets that produce conditional independence are nested, then the intersection of all sets (I R* ) producing conditional independence is well defined and has an associated random variable I R with the required property, although it may not be unique (e.g., strictly monotonic transformations and affine transformations of I R also preserve the property). In the more general case of non-nested information sets with the required property, it is possible that no uniquely defined minimal relevant set exists. Among collections of nested sets that possess the required property, there is a minimal set defined by intersection but there may be multiple minimal sets corresponding to each collection. 
Control Function † Yes (for nonparametric identification)
Conventional, but not required
can be varied independently of 0 (X ) and 1 (X ), respectively, and intercepts can be identified through limit arguments or symmetry assumptions.
Definition 3. The agent's information set, (I A ), is defined by the information I A used by the agent when choosing among treatments. Accordingly, we call I A the agent's information.
Definition 4. The econometrician's full information set,
(I E* ), is defined as all of the information available to the econometrician, I E* .
Definition 5. The econometrician's information set, (I E ), is defined by the information used by the econometrician when analyzing the agent's choice of treatment, I E , in conducting an analysis of matching.
For the case where a unique minimal relevant information set exists, only three restrictions are implied by the structure of these sets: (I R ) ʕ (I R* ), (I R ) ʕ (I A ), and (I E ) ʕ (I E* ). 28 The first we have already discussed. The second requires that the minimal relevant information set must be part of the information the agent uses when deciding which treatment to take. It is the information in (I A ) that gives rise to the selection problem. The third requires that the information used by the econometrician must be part of the information he observes. Aside from these obvious orderings, the econometrician's information set may be different from the agent's or the relevant information set. The econometrician may know something the agent doesn't know, for typically he is observing events after the decision is made. At the same time, there may be private information known to the agent. Matching assumption (M-1) or (M-3) implies that
so that the econometrician uses at least the minimal relevant information set, but of course he may use more. Recall that the decision-maker ("agent") may be different from the person who experiences the outcome. Thus the decision-maker may be the parent and the outcomes studied those of the child.
In order to have a concrete example of these information sets and their associated random variables, we assume that the economic model generating the data is a generalized Roy model of the form
we further assume
where f 1 , f 2 , ε V , ε 1 , ε 0 are assumed to be mean-zero random variables that are independent of each other and Z, so that all the correlation among the elements of (U 0 , U 1 , U V ) is captured by f ϭ ( f 1 , f 2 ). 29 We keep implicit any dependence on X, which may be general. The minimal relevant information for this model when the factor loadings are not zero (␣ ij 0) is
The agent's information set may include different variables. If we assume that ε 0 , ε 1 are shocks to outcomes not known to the agent at the time treatment decisions are made, the agent's information is
Under perfect certainty on the part of the agent,
This is the information set that justifies the form of the selection rule given in equation (3). 30 In either case, not all of the information available to the agent is required to obtain conditional independence (M-1). All three information sets guarantee conditional independence, but only the first is minimal relevant.
The observing economist may know some variables not in I A , I R* , or I R but not know all of the variables in I R . In the following subsections, we address the question of what happens when the matching assumption that (I E ) ʖ (I R ) does not hold. That is, we analyze what happens to the bias from matching as the amount of information used by the econometrician is changed. In order to get closed-form expressions for the biases of the treatment parameters we make the additional assumption that
where ⌺ is a matrix with ( f 1 2 , f 2 2 , ε V 2 , ε 1 2 , ε 0 2 ) on the diagonal and 0 for all the nondiagonal elements. This 28 This formulation assumes that the agent makes the treatment decision. If not, then we mean by the agent the decision-maker. The requirement (I R ) ʕ (I R* ) is satisfied by nested sets.
29 Models that take this form are known as factor models and have been applied in the context of selection models by Aakvik, Heckman, and Vytacil (2004) , Carneiro, Hansen, and , Hansen, Heckman, and Mullen (2004) , and Navarro-Lozano (2002), among others. 30 If agents do not know ε 1 and ε 0 and set these values to 0 in making their decisions, equation (3) is modified appropriately to set ε 1 ϭ ε 0 ϭ 0. assumption links matching models to conventional normal selection models. We next analyze various cases.
A. The Economist Uses the Minimal Relevant Information:
We begin by analyzing the case in which the information used by the analyst is I E ϭ {Z, f 1 , f 2 }, so that the econometrician has access to a relevant information set and it is larger than the minimal relevant information set. In this case it is straightforward to show that matching identifies all of the mean treatment parameters with no bias. The matching estimator has population mean
and all of the mean treatment parameters collapse to this same expression; for, conditional on knowing f 1 and f 2 , there is no selection, because (ε 1 , ε 0 ) --U V . Recall that I R ϭ { f 1 , f 2 } and the economist needs less information to achieve condition (M-1) than is contained in I E .
In this case the analysis of Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983) tells us that knowledge of (Z, f 1 , f 2 ) and knowledge of P(Z, f 1 , f 2 ) are equivalent, so that matching on the propensity score also identifies all of the treatment parameters conditional on P. If we write the propensity score as
, where ⌽ is the cdf of a standard normal random variable and f ϭ ( f 1 , f 2 ). We abuse notation slightly by using z for the realized fixed value of Z and f for the realized value of f. The population matching condition implies that
and it is equal to all of the treatment parameters, because
where is the density of a standard normal random variable. As a consequence of the assumptions about mutual independence of the errors,
In the context of this model, the case considered in this subsection is the one matching is designed to solve. Even though a selection model generates the data, the fact that the information used by the econometrician includes the minimal relevant information makes matching a correct solution to the selection problem. We can estimate the treatment parameters with no bias, for, as a consequence of the assumptions made, (U 1 , U 0 ) --D͉( f, Z), which is exactly what matching requires. The minimal relevant information set is even smaller than what has been used here. We only need to know ( f 1 , f 2 ) to secure conditional independence. We can define the propensity score solely in terms of f 1 and f 2 , and Rosenbaum and Rubin's result still goes through. Our analysis in this section focuses on treatment parameters conditional on particular values of P(Z, f ) ϭ p( z, f ), that is, on fixed values of p, but we could condition more finely. Using Z, f 1 , f 2 , we can define the treatment parameters more finely. Conditioning on p( z, f ) defines the treatment parameters more coarsely. We can use either fine or coarse conditioning to construct the unconditional treatment effects.
B. The Economist Does Not Use All of the Minimal Relevant Information
Next, suppose that the information used by the econometrician is I E ϭ ͕Z͖, the selection rule (3) generates the choice of treatment, and there is selection on the unobservable (to the analyst) f 1 , f 2 , that is, the factor loadings ␣ ij are all nonzero. Recall that we assume that Z and the f are independent. In this case the event (V ԯ 0, Z ϭ z) is characterized by
Using the analysis presented in the Appendix, the bias for the different treatment parameters is given by
It is not surprising that matching on variables that exclude the relevant conditioning variables produces bias for the conditional [on p( z)] treatment parameters. The advantage of working with a closed-form expression for the bias is that it allows us to answer questions about the magnitude of this bias under different assumptions about the information available to the analyst, and to present some simple examples. We next use the expressions (4), (5), and (6) as benchmarks against which to compare the relative size of the bias when we enlarge the econometrician's information set beyond Z.
C. Adding Information to the Econometrician's Information Set I E : Using Some but Not All the Information from the Minimal Relevant Information Set I R
Suppose that the econometrician uses more information but not all of the information in the minimal relevant information set. He still reports values of the parameters conditional on specific p values, but now the model for p has different conditioning variables. Possibly the data set assumed in the preceding section is augmented, or else the econometrician decides to use information previously available. In particular, assume that
Under conditions 1, 2, and 3 presented below, the biases for the treatment parameters conditional on values of P ϭ p are reduced in absolute value relative to their values in section VI-B by changing the conditioning set in this way. We define expressions comparable to ␤ 1 and ␤ 0 for this case:
We compare the biases under the two cases using the formulas (4)- (6), suitably modified but keeping p fixed at a specific value [even though this implies different conditioning sets in terms of ( z, f )].
Condition 1.
The bias produced by using matching to estimate TT is smaller in absolute value for any given p when the new information set (IЈ E ) is used if
Condition 2. The bias produced by using matching to estimate ATE is smaller in absolute value for any given p when the new information set (IЈ E ) is used if
Condition 3. The bias produced by using matching to estimate MTE is smaller in absolute value for any given p when the new information set (IЈ E ) is used if
PROOF: These propositions are straightforward applications of the formulas (4)-(6), modified to allow for the different covariance structure produced by the information structure assumed in this section (replacing ␤ 0 with ␤Ј 0 , and ␤ 1 with ␤Ј 1 ).
It is important to notice that we condition on the same value of p in deriving these expressions, although the variables in P are different across different specifications of the model. Recall that propensity-score matching defines them conditional on P ϭ p.
THE REVIEW OF ECONOMICS AND STATISTICS
These conditions do not always hold. In general, whether or not the bias will be reduced by adding additional conditioning variables depends on the relative importance of the additional information in both the outcome equations and on the signs of the terms inside the absolute value.
Consider whether condition 1 is satisfied, and assume
When ␣ 02 /␣ V2 ϭ 0, clearly ␤ 0 Ͻ ␤Ј 0 . Adding information to the conditioning set increases bias. We can vary ␣ 02 /␣ V2 holding all other parameters constant. A direct computation shows that
As ␣ 02 increases, there is some critical value ␣ * 02 beyond which ␤ 0 Ͼ ␤Ј 0 . If we assumed that ␤ 0 Ͻ 0, however, the opposite conclusion would hold, and the conditions for reduction in bias would be harder to meet, as the relative importance of the new information would be increased. Similar expressions can be derived for ATE and MTE, in which the direction of the effect depends on the signs of the terms in the absolute value.
Figures 1, 2, and 3 illustrate the point that adding some but not all information from the minimal relevant set might increase the pointwise bias and the unconditional or average bias for all treatment parameters. In these figures we let the variances of the factors and the error terms be equal to 1 and set
so that we have a case in which the information being added is relatively unimportant with respect to outcomes. 31 The fact that the pointwise (and overall) bias might increase when adding some but not all information from I R is a feature that is not shared by the method of control functions. Because the method of control functions models the stochastic dependence of the unobservables in the outcome equations on the observables, changing the variables observed by the econometrician to include f 2 does not generate bias. It only changes the control function used. That is, by adding f 2 we change the control function from
but do not generate any bias by using the control function estimator. This is a major advantage of this method. It controls for the bias of the omitted conditioning variables by modeling it. Of course, if the model for the bias term is not valid, neither is the correction for the bias. Semiparametric selection estimators are designed to protect the analyst against model misspecification (see, for example, Powell, 1994) . Matching evades this problem by assuming that the analyst always knows the correct conditioning variables and that they satisfy assumption (M-1).
D. Adding Information to the Econometrician's Information Set: Using Proxies for the Relevant Information
Suppose that instead of knowing some part of the minimal relevant information set, such as f 2 , the analyst has access to a proxy for it. 32 In particular, assume that he has access to a variable Z that is correlated with f 2 but that is not the full minimal relevant information set. That is, define the econometrician's information to be
and suppose that he uses it, so I E ϭ Ĩ E* . In order to obtain closed-form expressions for the biases we further assume that
We define expressions comparable to ␤ and ␤Ј:
By substituting for IЈ E by Ĩ E and ␤Ј j by ␤ j ( j ϭ 0, 1) in conditions 1, 2, and 3 of section VI-C we obtain results for the bias in this case. Whether Ĩ E will be bias-reducing depends on how well it spans I R and on the signs of the terms in the absolute values in those conditions in section VI-C.
In this case, however, there is another parameter to 31 We compute the average bias for P ʦ [.01, .99].
32 For example, the returns-to-schooling literature often uses different test scores, like AFQT or IQ, to proxy for missing ability variables. consider: the correlation between Z and f 2 . If ͉͉ ϭ 1, we are back to the case of Ĩ E ϭ IЈ E , because Z is a perfect proxy for f 2 . If ϭ 0, we are essentially back to the case analyzed in section VI-C. Because we know that the bias at a particular value of p might either increase or decrease when f 2 is used as a conditioning variable but f 1 is not, we know that it is not possible to determine whether the bias increases or decreases as we change the correlation between f 2 and Z . That is, we know that going from ϭ 0 to ͉͉ ϭ 1 might change the bias in any direction. Use of a better proxy in this correlational sense may produce a more biased estimate.
From the analysis of section VI-C it is straightforward to derive conditions under which the bias generated when the econometrician's information is Ĩ E is smaller than when it is IЈ E . That is, it can be the case that knowing the proxy variable Z is better than knowing the actual variable f 2 . Take again the analysis of treatment on the treated as an example (that is, condition 1). The bias in absolute value (at a fixed value of p) is reduced when Z is used instead of f 2 if
Figures 4, 5, and 6 use the same true model as used in the previous section to illustrate the two points being made here. Namely, using a proxy for an unobserved relevant variable might increase the bias. On the other hand, it might be better in terms of bias to use a proxy than to use the actual variable f 2 . However, as Figures 7, 8 , and 9 show, by changing ␣ 02 from 0.1 to 1, using a proxy might increase the bias over using the actual variable f 2 . Notice that the bias need not be universally negative or positive, but depends on p.
E. The Case of a Discrete Treatment
The points that we have made in this paper do not actually depend on all of the assumptions we have made to produce simple examples. In particular, we require neither normality nor additive separability of the outcome equations. The proposition that matching identifies the correct treatment if the econometrician's information set includes all the minimal relevant information is true more generally, provided that any additional extraneous information used is exogenous in a sense to be defined precisely in the next section. In this subsection, we present a simple analysis of a discrete treatment that does not rely on either normality or separability of outcome equations. 33 Suppose that outcomes (Y j ) are binary random variables generated by the following model:
where j ϭ 1 corresponds to treatment and j ϭ 0 corresponds to no treatment. People receive treatment according to the rule
and we assume that
Each of these error components has zero mean. The observed outcome is either 0 or 1 and is given by
An example of such a model arises when we observe whether a person is working or not and when the probability of being employed might be different if the person has participated in a training program. There are many ways in which the effect of treatment can be defined in this model. (See Aakvik, Heckman, & Vytlacil, 2004.) One way is given by the ratio of the probability of observing Y 1 ϭ 1 given that the person receives treatment, to the counterfactual probability of observing Y 0 ϭ 1 given that the person chooses treatment but does not receive it. That is, the effect of treatment is given by
A second definition works with odds ratios:
One could also work with logs:
Under the null hypothesis of no effect of treatment, ⌬ 1 ϭ ⌬ 2 ϭ 1. More generally, these ratios can be either smaller 33 See Aakvik, Heckman, and Vytlacil (2004) for an analysis of discrete treatment effects in a latent variable model. See also Heckman (1998) , where this framework originates. or greater than 1, depending on whether there is a positive or negative effect of treatment. In order to fix ideas, we will call ⌬ 1 the effect of treatment, with the understanding that equivalent results can be obtained for other definitions.
MATCHING, INSTRUMENTAL VARIABLES, AND CONTROL FUNCTIONS 45
The econometrician measures the effect of treatment by matching the observed distributions according to some variables that he observes. Because Y 0 is only observed when D ϭ 0, the analyst attempts to identify the effect of treatment from
The denominator replaces the desired probability Pr(Y 0 ϭ 1, D ϭ 1͉I E ) by the available information Pr(Y 0 ϭ 1, D ϭ 0͉I E ). Let there be no real effect of treatment, so that, in the model given by equations (7) and (8), we have that ⌬ 1 ϭ 1 and ⌬ 2 ϭ 1, so
which can be generated by setting
where F X denotes the cdf of X. We initially assume that the analyst has access to the minimal relevant information set and uses it. That is, we assume that
In this case, the probability limit of the estimated effect of treatment in large samples of independently distributed observations is
Under the null of no treatment effect, ⌬ 1 ϭ ⌬ 2 ϭ 1. Conditioning on ( f 1 , f 2 ) removes any dependence on D, and we can replace the denominator of ⌬ 1 by Pr(Y 0 ϭ 1, D ϭ 0͉ f 1 , f 2 ). If we do not condition on information that contains the minimal relevant information set, this is no longer true. In general,
The biases can be substantial. Suppose that I Љ E ϭ { f 2 }, and consider the following simulations. Assume that the true model is
where ⌺ is the identity matrix. Values of ␣ V2 are specified in the examples presented below. Given these assumptions, there is no effect of treatment, so ⌬ 1 ϭ 1. In figures 10 and 11 we show what happens when the analyst uses the population counterpart to the matching estimator,
to measure the effect of treatment. Figure 10 illustrates the case in which we assume that ␣ V2 ϭ 1, whereas figure  11 shows the case of ␣ V2 ϭ Ϫ1. In both cases matching does not estimate the true effect of treatment when the analyst uses information that does not contain the full minimal relevant information set. Furthermore, the discrepancy between the population counterpart to the estimator and the true effect of treatment changes as we change the level of f 2 on which we are conditioning. Depending on the choice of f 2 , we get either positive or negative estimated treatment effects even though there is no causal effect of treatment. This result is again analogous to the case for continuous outcomes. Matching estimates are biased when the analyst does not use the minimal relevant information set. Figures 12-17 show that analogous results hold for the case in which the effect of treatment is defined by odds ratios
and the analyst uses
or the log versions of both ⌬ 1 and ⌬ 2 . 
THE REVIEW OF ECONOMICS AND STATISTICS
F. On the Use of Model Selection Criteria to Choose Matching Variables
We have shown that adding more variables from the minimal relevant information set, but not all variables in it, may increase bias. There are no rigorously justified algorithms for identifying a relevant information set. Adding variables that are statistically significant in the treatment choice equation is not guaranteed to select a set of conditioning variables that satisfies condition (M-1). This is demonstrated by the analysis of section VI-C that shows that adding f 2 when it determines D may increase bias at any selected value of p. The existing literature (for example, Heckman, Ichimura, & Todd, 1997) proposes other criteria based on selecting a set of conditioning variables based on a goodness-of-fit criterion , where a higher means a better fit. The intuition behind such criteria is that by using some measure of goodness of fit as a guiding principle one is using information relevant to the decision process. It is clear that knowing f 2 improves the goodness of fit, so that in general such a rule is deficient if f 1 is not known or is not used.
An implicit assumption underlying such procedures is that the added conditioning variables C are exogenous in the following sense:
where I E is interpreted as the variables initially used as conditioning variables before C is added. Failure of exogeneity is a failure of condition (M-1), and matching estimators based on the augmented information set (I E , C) are biased when the condition is not satisfied. In the literature, the use of model selection criteria is justified in two different ways. Sometimes it is claimed that they provide a relative guide. Sets of variables with higher (better goodness of fit) are alleged to be better than sets of variables with lower in the sense that they generate lower biases. However, we have already shown that this is not true. We know that enlarging the analyst's information from I E ϭ {Z} to IЈ E ϭ {Z, f 2 } will improve the fit, because f 2 is also in I A and I R . But going from I E to IЈ E might increase the bias. So it is not true that combinations of variables that increase some measure of fit necessarily reduce the bias. Table 4 illustrates this point using a normal example. Going from row 1 to row 2 (adding f 2 ) improves the goodness of fit and increases the unconditional or overall bias for all three treatment parameters, because condition (M-4) is violated.
A rule of thumb is sometimes invoked as an absolute standard against which to compare alternative models. The argument is as follows. The analyst asserts that there is a combination of variables IЉ that satisfies condition (M-1) and hence produces zero bias and a value of ϭ Љ larger than that for any other I. Now we know that conditioning on {Z, f 1 , f 2 } generates zero bias. However, we can exclude Z and still obtain zero bias. Because Z is a determinant of D, this shows immediately that the best-fitting model does not necessarily identify the minimal relevant information set. In this example including Z is innocuous because there is still zero bias and the added conditioning variables satisfy condition (M-4) where I E ϭ ( f 1 , f 2 ). In general, such a rule is not innocuous. If goodness of fit is used as a rule to choose variables on which to match, there is no guarantee it produces a desirable conditioning set. If we include in the conditioning set variables C that violate condition (M-4), they may improve the fit of predicted probabilities but worsen the bias.
The following is one of many possible examples. We construct a collection of conditioning variablesĨ E with a better fit for D and a larger conditional on P ϭ p bias than can be obtained from just conditioning on { f 1 , f 2 } with no bias in the estimated treatment effects. Building on the model of (3), let
S might be a preference elicitation from a questionnaire that erroneously elicits the true valuation of the relative benefit of taking treatment for different Z values. is the measurement error. The expressions for the biases are the same as in equations (4)-(6) using␤ j ( j ϭ 0, 1) instead of ␤ j , where 1); f2 ϳ N(0, 1) .
. In general, these expressions are not zero, so that using propensity-score matching based on Z and S will generate a bias at most values of p, whereas conditioning on f 1 , f 2 produces no bias. The source of the bias is the measurement error in S for V. Now, to prove that this combination of variables has a better fit, all we need do is arbitrarily reduce 2 . In particular, when 2 ϭ 0 we can predict D perfectly. That is, for
However, when the limit is attained, assumption (M-2) is violated and matching breaks down. Making 2 arbitrarily small, we can predict D arbitrarily well, so we can always increase enough to find a combination of variables with better fit for predicted probabilities than the fit obtained using f 1 and f 2 and obtain a larger bias than in a model that conditions only on the minimal relevant information f 1 and f 2 when the bias is zero. Table 4 illustrates this point by generating two such variables (S 1 , S 2 ) and showing that, by reducing 2 , we are able to increase either of two goodness-of-fit criteria (the percentage of correct in-sample predictions of D and the pseudo R 2 ) above those of the model with I E ϭ I R . Adding a model based on S 2 and Z (bottom row) increases the successful prediction rate over the case when the true model is used (the model based on {Z, f 1 , f 2 }), but it is biased for all parameters and substantially biased for overall (unconditional) ATE and MTE.
A more general example that illustrates the key idea in the previous example and that does not entail a violation of assumption (M-2) in the limit considers use of a proxy regressor
where Z --( f 1 , f 2 , , ); ( f 1 , f 2 , , ) has mean zero; f 1 --f 2 , --, and ( f 1 , f 2 ) --(, ); is possibly dependent on ε V in the latent variable generating the treatment choice; and is measurement error. Then for different levels of dependence between and ε V , and different weights on Z, f 1 , f 2 and on the scale of measurement error, Q can be a better predictor of D than f 1 , f 2 or even f 1 , f 2 , Z.
However, in general, (Y 1 , Y 0 ) --⁄ D͉Q, because Q is an imperfect proxy for the combinations of f 1 and f 2 entering Y 1 and Y 0 . Thus conditioning on Q can produce a better fit for D but greater bias for the treatment parameters. 34 The essential feature of these examples is that the selected conditioning variables are endogenous with respect to the outcome equation [they violate assumption (M-1) or (M-4)]. If all candidate conditioning variables were restricted to be exogenous in this sense, our example could not be constructed. This underscores the importance of the econometric concept of endogeneity, which is sometimes viewed as an inessential distinction in selecting the conditioning variables in matching. Although it is irrelevant for defining parameters, it is essential when using goodnessof-fit measures for selecting conditioning variables.
VII. Concluding Remarks
This paper considers three main points regarding the use of the propensity score in econometric evaluation methods. The first point is that the economic and statistical assumptions required to justify the use of the propensity score are different in selection, matching, and instrumental variable models. In general, one set of assumptions neither implies nor is implied by the other. In the case of additive separability of outcome equations, matching models are a special case of selection models that assume that conditioning It is assumed that is independent of all other error components on the right-hand sides of the equations for Q, I, and Y. From normal regression theory we know that conditioning is equivalent to residualizing. Constructing the residuals, we obtain
By a parallel argument,
Y --I͉Q requires that I Ϫ I Q and Y Ϫ Y Q be uncorrelated, which in general does not happen. Letting the dependence between and ε I get large, and setting ␣ to suitable values, we can predict I better (in the sense of R 2 ) with Q than with . Letting D ϭ 1(I Ͼ 0) produces a simple version of the example in the text, because better prediction of I produces better prediction of D.
eliminates bias, whereas control function methods model selection bias. Matching makes strong assumptions that are not required in the method of control functions. It assumes that, conditional on observables, the marginal return is the average return. One benefit of such strong assumptions is weaker assumptions about other features of the underlying economic model. Matching does not require separability of outcomes, exogeneity of regressors, or exclusion restrictions, provided valid conditioning sets are known. The second main point is that the literature on matching provides no guidance on the choice of the conditioning variables that generate identification. We define the concept of the minimal relevant conditioning set that is assumed in matching. In general, it differs from the information set available to the analyst. Adding some of the variables in the minimal relevant set, but not all, is not guaranteed to reduce bias, and we offer examples of this point.
Our third main point is that conventional model selection criteria sometimes used to pick the variables in the conditioning set are not guaranteed to work. We offer examples where application of goodness-of-fit criteria advocated in the literature select conditioning sets that generate more bias than conditioning sets that are less successful in terms of a model selection criterion. The methods work for choice among exogenous conditioning variables. This highlights the point that the econometric distinctions of exogeneity and endogeneity play crucial roles in applications of matching in the choice of appropriate conditioning sets. The sensitivity of estimates obtained from matching to the choice of conditioning variables, the inability of the method to model omitted relevant conditioning variables, and the lack of any clear rule for selecting conditioning variables should give pause to economists who embrace this method. 35 More robust methods based on the control function approach explicitly model omitted conditioning variables. Recent semiparametric advances in the development of control functions make these procedures less vulnerable to the distributional assumptions that plagued the earlier literature on the topic (see Powell, 1994; . Assume Z --(U 0 , U 1 , U V ). Let ٪ and ⌽٪ be the pdf and the cdf of a standard normal random variable. Then the propensity score for this model for Z ϭ z is given by
Because the event (V ԯ 0, Z ϭ z) can be written as
we can write the conditional expectations required to get the biases for the treatment parameters conditional on Z ϭ z as a function of p( z). For U 1 ,
Similarly, for U 0 , 
